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ABSTRACT
Background Vietnam’s 2007 comprehensive
motorcycle helmet policy increased helmet use from
about 30% of riders to about 93%. We aimed to
simulate the effect that this legislation might have on:
(a) road trafﬁc deaths and non-fatal injuries, (b)
individuals’ direct acute care injury treatment costs, (c)
individuals’ income losses from missed work and (d)
individuals’ protection against medical impoverishment.
Methods and ﬁndings We used published secondary
data from the literature to perform a retrospective
extended cost-effectiveness analysis simulation study of
the policy. Our model indicates that in the year following
its introduction a helmet policy employing standard
helmets likely prevented approximately 2200 deaths and
29 000 head injuries, saved individuals US$18 million in
acute care costs and averted US$31 million in income
losses. From a societal perspective, such a
comprehensive helmet policy would have saved $11 000
per averted death or $830 per averted non-fatal injury.
In terms of ﬁnancial risk protection, trafﬁc injury is so
expensive to treat that any injury averted would
necessarily entail a case of catastrophic health
expenditure averted.
Conclusions The high costs associated with trafﬁc
injury suggest that helmet legislation can decrease the
burden of out-of-pocket payments and reduced injuries
decrease the need for access to and coverage for
treatment, allowing the government and individuals to
spend resources elsewhere. These ﬁndings suggest that
comprehensive motorcycle helmet policies should be
adopted by low-income and middle-income countries
where motorcycles are pervasive yet helmet use is less
common.
INTRODUCTION
Road trafﬁc injury (RTI) accounts for a substantial
and increasing burden of mortality, morbidity and
healthcare costs in long-income and middle-income
nations. Globally, road trafﬁc is responsible for 1.3
million fatalities and 78 million non-fatal injuries
per year.1 2 In the Western Paciﬁc, it is the leading
cause of mortality for people aged 15–49.3 Direct
economic costs are estimated to exceed $500
billion worldwide and are anticipated to grow in
tandem with motorisation of the developing
world.2 4 Importantly, the potentially substantial
medical out-of-pocket (OOP) costs associated with
trafﬁc injury may result in catastrophic expendi-
tures (expenditures that crowd out a signiﬁcant
portion of household expenditures) and subsequent
impoverishment.5
In response to the growing burden of trafﬁc
injury, the government of Vietnam passed a com-
prehensive motorcycle helmet use legislation in
2007. This legislation expanded mandatory helmet
use to all riders on all roads, substantially increased
penalties for helmet non-use and made provisions
for increased enforcement.6 As a result, helmet use
increased from 30% of riders to 93% within
months.7 8 Studies in other settings have examined
the inﬂuence of helmet use policies on aggregate
population health, but the distribution of beneﬁts
and equity improvements resulting from such
changes in regulation remains understudied and
uncertain.9 10
Trafﬁc injury can lead to substantial and poten-
tially impoverishing health expenditures.5
Legislation mandating helmet use is one non-health
sector policy that may protect individuals against
this ﬁnancial risk. In nations with universal health
coverage, helmet regulation may have the add-
itional advantage of reducing government trafﬁc
injury treatment expenditures and thus liberate
spending for other health conditions. Deﬁning the
magnitude of the health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts
attributable to Vietnam’s comprehensive helmet
policy might bolster the case for a similar policy in
neighbouring countries such as Cambodia and in
other low-income and middle-income countries.
Extended cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA)
incorporates the dimensions of equity and ﬁnancial
risk protection (FRP) into economic evaluation.11–
13 In this paper, we used a simulation model to
perform an ECEA that examines the inﬂuence that
Vietnam’s 2007 helmet legislation is anticipated to
have had on: (a) road trafﬁc deaths and non-fatal
injuries, (b) individuals’ direct acute care injury
treatment costs, (c) individuals’ income losses from
missed work and (d) FRP for those individuals.
METHODS
Design
For the era of interest, the annual number of non-
fatal trafﬁc injuries reported by Vietnam’s National
Trafﬁc Safety Committee is not disaggregated by
road user category and generally lacks consistency
and credibility (eg, the 10 300 non-fatal road trafﬁc
injuries reported by police in 2007 are dramatically
different from the 445 000 non-fatal road trafﬁc
injuries noted in health data reports from the same
year).14 Recognising this, we chose to develop a
model that uses secondary data to simulate the ben-
eﬁts that might be expected following the 2007
comprehensive helmet policy. After ensuring our
model was consistent with previously reported
reductions in total road trafﬁc deaths,6 15 we
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performed an ECEA to estimate the distribution of health bene-
ﬁts and costs across income groups. Conceptually, our study
period includes a 1-year prepolicy baseline era ( July 2006–June
2007), a 6-month transition period during which the majority
of the helmet policy legislation was introduced and came into
effect ( June 2007–December 2007) and a 1-year postpolicy
evaluation era ( January 2008–December 2008).
Setting
At the midpoint of our study, Vietnam was a lower-middle
income country with a population of about 84 million and a
per capita gross domestic product of about US$1200.16 About
95% of registered vehicles were motorised two-wheeled vehi-
cles.17 The incidence of road trafﬁc deaths prior to the 2007
helmet use legislation was estimated to be about 14 per 100 000
people per year.14 About 55% of healthcare costs were paid out
of pocket.18 19
Prior to 2007, Vietnam had limited motorcycle helmet legisla-
tion with incomplete implementation and enforcement. A com-
prehensive motorcycle helmet legislation that made helmet use
compulsory for all motorcycle riders and passengers on all
roads was introduced in June 2007, came into force for govern-
ment workers in September 2007 and came in force for the
general public in December 2007.6 Legislation introduced in
September 2007 increased ﬁnes for helmet non-use from US$2–
5 to US$11–22 per offence, the latter representing about 30%
of the average monthly income per capita.6 20 At that time, the
majority of Vietnamese households were willing to pay the
average market price of US$17 for a standard helmet.21
Variables
In our simulation study, all input parameters were abstracted
from academic studies and from reports issued by governmental
and non-governmental agencies (table 1; online supplementary
table S1). Output estimates of primary interest include trafﬁc
deaths averted, non-fatal trafﬁc injuries averted, individuals’
OOP acute care medical costs averted and individuals’ income
losses averted during the 1-year postpolicy era. Costs were
viewed from the individual perspective including both OOP
acute care costs and income losses. Estimation of subacute and
chronic outpatient medical costs was not possible as reliable
input parameters were not available. All costs were expressed in
2012 US dollars and were converted using consumer price
indices and exchange rates as reported by the World Bank
World Development Indicators.16
Major assumptions
According to the National Vietnam Trafﬁc Safety Committee,
the number of registered motorcycles increased from 21 million
in 2007 to 25 million in 2008; yet, for simplicity, our model
makes the assumption that the number of registered motorcycles
remained static at the prepolicy level during the study period.15
This assumption makes our estimates more conservative but sub-
stantially improves interpretability and generalisability. In our
main analysis we assumed that the effectiveness of motorcycle
helmets in Vietnam was equivalent to published estimates from
high-income countries. Major concerns have been raised regard-
ing the proliferation of substandard helmets in Vietnam.28–30
Local data regarding the effectiveness of substandard helmets
was not available, and so we chose to address this crucial issue
in a separate sensitivity analysis. For our main analysis, we
assumed that the distribution of trafﬁc deaths and non-fatal
injuries across income quintiles reﬂected the distribution of
motorcycle ownership across quintiles as obtained from the
Vietnamese Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), an assump-
tion that was further explored in sensitivity analyses.25
Consequences for health
To simulate the impact on health consequences, we ﬁrst esti-
mated the number of trafﬁc deaths and non-fatal head injuries
that were attributable to motorcycles in the 1-year baseline era
as well as the prepolicy proportion of motorcycle riders using
helmets. Helmet effectiveness (expressed as the RR of head
injury among helmeted riders compared with the risk among
non-helmeted riders) was estimated using published ORs. By
accounting for the increase in the proportion of helmeted riders
following the comprehensive helmet policy, we simulated the
number of deaths and head injuries averted within each quintile
during the 1-year postpolicy evaluation era (see online
supplementary appendix tables S3-S4 and equations S1-S4).
Consequences for cost and affordability
We simulated the OOP acute care costs averted by the policy by
subtracting the expected OOP costs of hospitalisation in the
postpolicy era from the expected OOP cost in the baseline era.
The expected cost was derived from published estimates on
average cost of injury with and without a helmet, which takes
into account variation in severity and type of injury based on
helmet usage.23 These changes in costs were then multiplied by
the estimated change in incidence of motorcycle injuries (see
online supplementary appendix equation S5).
Empirical research has shown variation in average direct acute
care cost of treatment by income group in Vietnam.23 We
Table 1 Model input parameters*
Parameter
Estimate
(range) References
Population of Vietnam 84 000 000 16
Prepolicy RTI deaths 13 000 14
Prepolicy non-fatal RTIs 445 000 14
Proportion of RTI deaths
attributable to motorcycles (%)
58 (51–73) 9 21 22
Proportion of non-fatal RTIs
attributable to motorcycles (%)
59 (51–75) 7–9 21 22
Proportion of non-fatal motorcycle
RTIs with head injury (%)
21 (10–32) 23
Prepolicy helmet use (%) 30 (20–40) 7 8
Postpolicy helmet use (%) 93 (83–98) 8
Average direct acute-care cost of
non-fatal RTI with a helmet (US$)
436 (366–506) 23
Average direct acute-care cost of
non-fatal RTI without a helmet
(US$)
559 (416–702) 23
Expected increase in treatment cost
for 10$ increase in income (%)
1 23
Income loss (weeks) 32 22
Mean per capita income, by
quintile (US$)
305, 530, 777,
1185, 2730
24
Motorcycle ownership distribution
by quintile (%)
20, 35, 54, 73,
94
25
RR of death, helmet vs no helmet 0.58 (0.50–0.79) 26
RR of injury, helmet vs no helmet 0.31 (0.25–0.66) 26
Per capita cost of policy
implementation (US$)
0.29 Ref. 27 (correspondence
from Dan Chisholm)
*Online supplementary appendix table S1 provides the detailed rationale and
additional sources for selection of point estimates and ranges.
RTI, road traffic injury.
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derived the average direct acute care cost of treatment in each
income quintile by combining the estimated quintile-speciﬁc
monthly income per capita with the reported 1% increase in trau-
matic brain injury (TBI) treatment cost for every $10 increase in
monthly income per capita.23 24 We calculated income losses by
multiplying monthly per capita income by the Vietnamese
average of 8 months away from work following TBI.22
We calculated two measures of FRP: cases of poverty averted
and catastrophic health expenditures averted. Both measures of
FRP reﬂect the reduction in ﬁnancial hardship that may occur
when an injury is averted or when the injury treatment cost is
reduced. Cases of poverty averted were deﬁned as the number
of individuals who would no longer fall below the national
poverty line due to trafﬁc injury as a result of the helmet policy.
In our base case model, the poverty line is such that 21% of the
population lives in poverty.16 Cases of catastrophic health
expenditures averted were deﬁned as the number of people who
would no longer be paying more than 25% of their per capita
annual income on direct acute care costs as a result of the
policy. The threshold for a catastrophic health expenditure
varies depending on the literature but generally lies between
2.5% and 15% of household income or 10% and 45% of dis-
posable income.31 Using a population of P individuals with a
certain income distribution,i we multiply the number of injured
before an intervention in each quintile by the probability that
they will face poverty or catastrophic health expenditure. We
then do the same estimate based on the postintervention injury
rate and costs. By subtraction we see how many cases of poverty
or catastrophic health expenditure were averted in the popula-
tion (see online supplementary appendix equation S6).
We approximated the governmental cost of implementing the
comprehensive helmet legislation in Vietnam by multiplying the
estimated per capita comprehensive helmet legislation imple-
mentation costs in Southeast Asia (including legislation and pro-
gramme management, media, enforcement and helmet
purchase) by the population of Vietnam.27 ii
Sensitivity analysis
We performed a univariate sensitivity analysis on key model
inputs to test their inﬂuence on our ﬁndings. Upper and lower
bounds for the inputs were obtained from published studies
wherever possible and were otherwise derived based on avail-
able data or plausibly estimated (see online supplementary
appendix and table S1). One critical sensitivity analysis explored
the impact of substandard helmets in Vietnam, accounting for
less safe designs (half-head or cap style), failure to meet quality
standards and inadequate fastening of chin straps
(Supplementary table S6). Each safety deﬁcit was assumed to
half the RR reduction for death or injury provided by the
helmet, and this was combined with the approximate population
prevalence of each deﬁcit to estimate a lower bound of
population-level helmet effectiveness (see online supplementary
appendix, table S1 and ﬁgures S9).
We also performed an additional set of sensitivity analyses to
evaluate the inﬂuence of model input distributional assumptions
on the distribution of health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts across income
quintiles (see online supplementary appendix and table S2). The
distribution of motorcycle deaths and non-fatal injuries across
quintiles, the distribution of prepolicy helmet use and the distri-
bution of postpolicy helmet use across quintiles were varied in
these analyses ﬁrst alone and then by multivariate sensitivity
analysis.
RESULTS
Assuming helmet effectiveness is equivalent to that in high-
income countries, our simulation estimates that the 2007 com-
prehensive helmet policy might have prevented approximately
2200 deaths and 29 000 head injuries, saved individuals US$18
million in direct acute care costs and averted US$29 million in
individual income losses in the year following its introduction
Table 2. We estimate that countrywide implementation of the
helmet policy cost the government US$24 million, although this
was offset by an unknown amount of government revenue
arising from increases in ﬁnes and enforcement.27 From a gov-
ernment perspective that accounts for implementation costs
only, the helmet policy is estimated to cost about US$11 000
per death averted or US$800 per non-fatal injury averted. From
a societal perspective (which sums individuals’ OOP direct acute
care cost savings, individuals’ averted income losses and the gov-
ernment’s implementation costs), the comprehensive helmet
policy saved approximately US$11 000 per death averted or US
$800 per non-fatal injury averted.
The main distributional analysis assumes that the distribution
of trafﬁc injury reﬂects the distribution of motorcycle ownership
across income quintiles and ﬁnds that the wealthiest quintiles
own the greatest number of motorcycles and thus accrue a larger
share of the health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts (in absolute terms)
from the 2007 helmet policy (ﬁgure 1). In terms of FRP, trafﬁc
injury is so expensive to treat that any injury averted would
necessarily entail a case of catastrophic health expenditure
averted (ﬁgures 2 and 3; That is to say, both before and after the
policy, trafﬁc injury leads to health expenditures that exceed
25% of per capita income amounting to over 22 000 cases of
catastrophic health expenditure averted. The helmet legislation
is likely to help avert poverty for those in the second and third
income quintiles amounting to nearly 11 000 cases of poverty
Table 2 Estimated reduction in death, injury and cost
Prepolicy estimate
(attributable to motorcycles)
Estimated absolute
reduction (range*)
Estimated relative
reduction, % (range*)
Deaths 7400 2200 (1000–2700) 29 (14–37)
Non-fatal head injuries 54 100 29 000 (12 700–44 500) 54 (23–82)
Direct acute care costs for non-fatal head injuries (million US$) 35 18 (8–28) 52 (24–81)
Income losses following death or non-fatal head injury (million US$) 63 29 (11–40) 46 (18–64)
Direct acute care costs plus income losses (million US$) 98 48 (24–72) 49 (24–73)
*Values in parentheses represent lower and upper bounds obtained on univariate sensitivity analyses.
iA proxy for individual income can be extracted from the income
distribution of Vietnam derived from its gross domestic product per
capita (US$1200 in 2012) and its Gini index (0.36).16 32
iiThis number was derived by Dan Chisholm, Jonathon Passmore, and
Nguyen Phuong Nam using the same model cited.27
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averted. This is due to the fact that all those in the ﬁrst quintile
are already poor, and the cost is not so high that those in the
fourth and ﬁfth quintiles will be thrust into poverty.
Sensitivity analysis
Lower and upper values obtained on univariate sensitivity ana-
lyses are presented in table 3. The sensitivity analysis that
accounted for substandard and inadequately fastened helmets
yielded the lowest estimates of averted deaths and injuries, a
ﬁnding that has clear implications for policy and enforcement.
Deaths, injuries and OOP costs averted were extremely sensitive
to variation in the proportion of motorcycle injuries anticipated
to cause head injury. Direct acute care costs averted were also
highly sensitive to variation in the average acute care costs for
helmeted and non-helmeted crash victims. These univariate sen-
sitivity analyses, along with those for cases of poverty averted
and catastrophic health expenditures averted, are presented
graphically in the online supplementary ﬁgures S1–S5 and S9.
Distributional sensitivity analyses demonstrate that the distri-
bution of health beneﬁts is highly sensitive to variation in the
distribution prepolicy of motorcycle injury across quintiles. Both
health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts accrue disproportionately to the
poor under conditions of perfectly equitable prepolicy motor-
cycle injury and death, a ﬁnding that is ampliﬁed when occur-
ring in conjunction with highly inequitable prepolicy helmet use
(with highest use among the wealthy) and perfectly equitable
postpolicy helmet use (see online supplementary appendix and
ﬁgures S4–S8).
DISCUSSION
Assuming helmet effectiveness equivalent to that in high-income
countries, our simulation estimates that the 2007 comprehensive
helmet policy prevented approximately 2200 deaths and 29 000
head injuries, saved individuals US$18 million in direct acute
care costs and averted US$29 million in individual income
losses in the year following its introduction. The combination of
anticipated health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts make a comprehensive
helmet policy strongly dominant to the prepolicy status quo.
These ﬁndings suggest that similar comprehensive legislation
and enforcement should be enacted in countries where motor-
cycles are pervasive yet helmet use is less common.
Importantly, the simulated relative reduction in motorcycle
crash deaths fell from 29% to 14% after accounting for the pro-
liferation of less effective helmets in Vietnam. Policymakers
wishing to enact an effective comprehensive helmet law might
wish to make provisions for adequate regulatory enforcement
among manufacturers, retailers and motorcycle riders to ensure
helmets are of adequate quality and appropriately fastened in
order to maximise the health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts of their
efforts.
The results of our ECEA suggest that the wealthy likely
accrued a large share of the absolute health and ﬁnancial bene-
ﬁts resulting from helmet use legislation. This ﬁnding was
dependent on our assumption that the risk of RTI tracked with
motorcycle ownership. In contrast, under all conditions tested
we found that the legislation likely prevented a greater number
of motorcycle-related cases of poverty among the near poor and
middle-income quintiles. This supports the conclusion that
injury prevention is also poverty prevention among individuals
of lesser wealth. In settings with universal health insurance, cost
savings from a comprehensive helmet policy (potentially sub-
stantial, as the wealthy are known to use a disproportionate
share of public health care) might also be liberated for use on
other health policy priorities.31
Figure 1 Deaths averted by income
quintile (I, poorest, V, richest).
Figure 2 Out-of-pocket costs averted by income quintile (1, poorest,
5, richest).
Figure 3 Financial risk protection afforded by income quintile
(1, poorest, 5, richest).
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The validity of our model’s estimates is supported by the
results of prior research. Our analysis anticipates a 29% reduc-
tion in motorcycle trafﬁc deaths and a 17% reduction in total
trafﬁc deaths, results that are similar to the 36% reduction in
motorcycle trafﬁc deaths generally anticipated with helmet legis-
lation and the 18% reduction in total trafﬁc deaths reported in
Vietnam in the year following introduction of the helmet legisla-
tion.6 10 Our results are also in harmony with the results of
other regional evaluations of helmet use legislation.33–35
Our analysis presents several limitations that relate to our
model and its inputs. First, we emphasise that our modelling
study estimated the anticipated effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of the 2007 comprehensive helmet policy in
Vietnam but did not measure the beneﬁts or costs directly. To
our knowledge, the observed beneﬁts and costs of this policy
have not been clearly articulated in the published academic lit-
erature despite the crucial importance of these values to an
evaluation of policy success. Second, many of our inputs
(including prepolicy deaths and injuries attributable to motor-
cycles, acute care costs and policy implementation costs) were
not directly available and had to be derived or estimated from
published reports. The predominant use of academic and non-
governmental reports in preference to government surveillance
data prioritises data quality but might diminish the local applic-
ability of our results. Third, our main analysis ignored the inﬂu-
ence of substandard helmets in Vietnam. For this reason, we
pursued a sensitivity analysis examining this issue limited by the
absence of reliable estimates of the relative effectiveness of the
substandard helmets, particularly in a setting with relatively low
trafﬁc speeds.36 37
Our analysis is also limited by a number of assumptions we
made in constructing our model. We assumed a constant
number of motorcycles on the road before and after the policy,
rendering our estimated beneﬁts more conservative, interpret-
able and generalisable.38 We ignored changes in the prevalence
of speeding and alcohol use, increased enforcement of non-
helmet laws, changes in road maintenance and congestion and
other secular trends. For our cost estimates, we do not account
for a potential increase in non-head injuries among riders whose
lives were saved by helmet use as the simulated number of
deaths averted represents <10% of the simulated number of
injuries averted, and this inﬂuence is anticipated to be minimal.
Lastly, we had insufﬁcient information to estimate the increases
in individuals’ costs and government revenue resulting from
improvements in enforcement and increased ﬁnes resulting from
the helmet policy. The potential for impoverishment due to
helmet infraction ﬁnes was assumed to be uncommon and rela-
tively inconsequential.
Our results suggest that Vietnam’s 2007 helmet legislation
was cost-effective. Our ECEA analysis suggests that large health
and ﬁnancial beneﬁts accrued to the wealthy, yet the policy also
provided signiﬁcant health beneﬁts and substantial FRP to
Vietnam’s poorest citizens. Policymakers wishing to account for
such effects may want to use ECEA to understand the likely
inﬂuence of policy on equity.
What is already known on the subject
▸ Helmet usage is a cost-effective way to prevent traumatic
brain injury.
▸ Vietnam’s helmet law successfully increased helmet usage
among Vietnamese motorbike riders.
What this study adds
▸ An estimation of the anticipated distribution of the beneﬁts
of helmet usage across socio-economic groups.
▸ An estimation of the anticipated level of ﬁnancial risk
protection afforded under helmet regulation.
▸ An estimation of the anticipated impact of substandard
helmets on the population level beneﬁts of a comprehensive
motorcycle helmet law.
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Green cross safety awards
The US National Safety Council (NSC) presented awards to the Air Force Safety Center, to United
Airlines Corporate Safety and to Gary Smith at Nationwide Children’s Hospital. The Air Force award
was for real-time evaluations that apparently resulted in a 29% fall in ‘mishaps’. After United and
Continental Airlines merged, new regulations required them to implement a safety management
system. Two years later injuries were reduced by 11%. Finally, Dr Smith is a researcher and
advocate for paediatric injury prevention, especially with respect to consumer product safety.
He played a key role in drafting the 2012 National Action Plan for Child Injury Prevention.
Occupational safety modernises data collection
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued a new rule in 2016 that
applies ideas from behavioural economics to improve workplace safety.
The rule requires employers in high-hazard industries to send injury data to the agency’s
website. OSHA believes this will “encourage employers to increase their efforts to prevent”
these injuries. The data will also enable employers to compare their safety performance against
that of others. As a bonus, these data will be part of the largest publicly available data set on
work injuries and thus beneﬁt researchers.
Pﬁzer drugs not to be used in executions
Pﬁzer announced that none of its drugs can be used in lethal injections in executions. 20 other
drug companies have this policy to avoid marketing difﬁculties. The policy has prompted several
states to adopt furtive methods for getting these drugs. Other states have delayed executions
while still others have chosen the electric chair, ﬁring squads or the gas chamber as alternatives.
Comment: One bizarre aspect of this issue hinges on whether drug substitutes might not meet
quality standards causing ‘undue suffering’. That puzzler aside, the Pﬁzer decision comes against
a backdrop of declining numbers of executions in the US; in 2015 there were 28 vs 98 in 1999.
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